FORMS OF CONTEXT-SENSITIVITY
April 16, 2024
West University of Timișoara
DESCRIPTION
Many (if not most) expressions in natural languages are context-sensitive, at least in the sense that the same sentences comprising them, when uttered in different contexts, can intuitively have different truth values. There are many ways in which this phenomenon can come about. The meaning of many context-sensitive expressions depends on the context in which they are uttered. Thus, one of the most common forms of context-sensitivity is indexicality: the meaning of expressions such as "I", "here", "now" etc. depends on the speaker's situation. Other expressions are dependent on less objective contextual factors, such as the speakers' beliefs, intentions or preferences. Another source of this form of context-sensitivity comes from the presuppositions the relevant expressions trigger. Finally, many expressions are said to be polysemous, with the exact meaning of a word in certain context being determined by pragmatic mechanisms. But there are other ways in which the context-sensitivity mentioned can manifest. For example, it has been contended that the meaning of certain expressions - and hence the truth value of the sentences in which they occur - depends on the content in which they are assessed.
In this workshop, we explore some of these forms of context-sensitivity, in relation to various natural language expressions (indexicals, predicates of taste, gender terms, pejoratives, dogwhistles, definite descriptions, terms for institutions, etc.). We address questions such as what is the best account of indexicality, what is the most fitting theory of presuppositions, what are the possible applications of the assessment-sensitivity framework, what do terms for institutions refer to, etc., as well as various crucial details that arise in connection to these questions.
ORGANIZATION
The workshop is organized by Dan Zeman and Adrian Briciu.
PROGRAM
(All times are in CEST)
10.15: Welcome
10.30-11.20: Dan Zeman (Slovak Academy of Sciences), "New Applications of the Assessment-Sensitivity Framework"
11.30-12.20: Justina Berškytė & Graham Stevens (University of Manchester), "Whose Taste Is It Anyway? Relativism, Judges and Retraction"
Lunch break
14.00-14.50: Andrei Moldovan (University of Salamanca), "The Frege-Strawson Approach to Presuppositions Reconsidered"
15.00-15.50: Andreea Popescu (Research Institute of the University of Bucharest), "Reference and Institutions"
16.00-16.50: Tadeusz Ciecierski (University of Warsaw), "Content-Bearers and Indexicality"
ABSTRACTS
Justina Berškytė & Graham Stevens (University of Manchester): "Whose Taste Is It Anyway? Relativism, Judges and Retraction"
(1) X at t1: Tofu is tasty
(2) X at t2: No, I take that back. Tofu is not tasty.
What X is seemingly doing by uttering (2) is taking back her previous true utterance of (1). We can think of X as disagreeing with her past self. This phenomenon is known as retraction and recently it has taken centre stage in the contextualist (Kneer, 2021) vs relativist (MacFarlane, 2014; Zeman, forthcoming) debates. In this explanatory paper, we build on our previous work (Berškytė & Stevens, 2022) to test some intuitions about retraction. Specifically, we ask what the nature of the judge has to be for relativistic retraction to make sense. We start with an assumption that relativists should endorse a relativistic notion of contradiction; namely, one should only count something as a contradiction if they assess it from the same context of assessment. Taking this assumption seriously would require that the context of assessment from which a judge takes back her past utterance is one and the same, otherwise, it’s no different than taking back an assertion on someone else’s behalf. However, it does not make sense to say that the context of assessment is the same, for retraction demands for one to evaluate their utterance from a new context of assessment. Whilst we do not think that this argument fully undermines relativism, we discuss the implications it has on the contextualism vs relativism debates.
Tadeusz Ciecierski (University of Warsaw): "Content-Bearers and Indexicality"
One potential conservative reaction to the concept of indexicality of content is a theory that treats indexicality as a property inherent to content-bearers. While this view aligns intuitively with linguistic cases, as indexicality is commonly seen as a property of expressions, it requires further elucidation when applied to intentional (mental) states as content-bearers. In this paper, I aim to present a theory that elucidates the indexicality of attitudes and other mental states by examining the properties of the bearers or vehicles of content.
The theory I shall present departs from an account of indexicality rooted in Frege's philosophy, specifically a hybrid expression view (cf. Frege, 1956). Various versions of this view (cf. Künne, 1992; Künne, 2010; Textor, 2007, 2015; Kripke, 2008; Penco, 2013; Ciecierski, 2019) share the common feature of conceiving content-bearers as complex objects. These objects, in addition to narrowly conceived components (linguistic expressions in the case of utterances or mental representations/forms in the case of mental states), consist of contextual elements such as the speaker, time of utterance, or place of utterance. Recognizing the differences in these content-bearers allows for the expression of a single standard and non-indexical content through appropriately contextually coordinated but different content-bearers, while different non-indexical contents are expressible by uncoordinated content-bearers. However, the theory is not immune to objections (cf. Perry, 1977, 491; Kaplan, 1989, 538). A notable challenge arises in explaining the intuition that an individual who loses track of time, like Rip van Winkle, shares the same thought when considering that today is sunny (on a day d in 1789) and when thinking that yesterday was sunny (on a day d' in 1800). One response to this challenge (cf. Tichy, 1986, 40; Textor, 2011, 168) suggests that a person who loses track of time fails to accurately capture the content of the thought that yesterday was sunny (on a day d' in 1800). This response, however, rejects the initial intuition entirely and flies in the face of the idea of the transparency of mental content: the content of Rip van Winkle thought is different from the content he believes his thought has. To address this problem, I propose the internalistic version of the hybrid expression view of
indexicality. While the standard hybrid expression view adopts an externalistic perspective, claiming that a hybrid expression (content-bearer) consists of a vehicle and an aspect of the relevant externally existing context of utterance (Externalistic Hybridity Claim), the internalistic version posits that a hybrid expression consists of a vehicle and an aspect of the relevant mental representation of a possible context of utterance (Internalistic Hybridity Claim). Accepting Internalistic Hybridity enables a nuanced treatment of cases where individuals are "lost in time"; For instance, Rip van Winkle, while entertaining the thought that yesterday was sunny, grasps the content of the hybrid representation consisting of a vehicle (the mental counterpart of "yesterday") and the representation of the time of utterance corresponding to d' + 1 1979. Consequently, he fails to entertain the content that it was sunny on d'-1 1800, but he apprehends a different yet related content. His mistake in content attribution is a result of a factual error—selecting the wrong context as actual. This analysis aligns with the intuitive transparency of mental content: Rip van Winkle grasps the appropriate content and maintains a disposition to differentiate between it and the content expressed had the time of utterance been located on a specific day in 1800. In the final parts of my paper I shall discuss the challenges that the theory might face as well as its potential merits. One potential merit of this theory is its uniform treatment of linguistic and mental indexicality. One potential challenge is the tension between the Internalistic Hybridity Claim and the directly referential nature of indexicals. I shall argue, however, that there is no conflict between the two: Internalistic Hybridity does not entail that indexicals and demonstratives are not directly referential, it rather claims that in cases where the mental representations of relevant aspects of the context do not correspond to actual aspects of the context the reference of indexicals and demonstratives might be moved to a different object (while remaining direct in the Kaplanian sense).
Andrei Moldovan (University of Salamanca): "The Frege-Strawson Approach to Presuppositions Reconsidered"
It is common to find in the literature on presuppositions a discussion of the so-called “Frege-Strawson” approach, (e.g., Kaplan 1970: 279; Kripke 1977: 269; Garcia-Carpintero 2000: 13; Salmon 2007: 69; Pelletier & Linsky 2005: 203; Elbourne 2013: 2; Schoubye 2013; Beaver, Geurts & Denlinger 2021: §2). What is standardly called the “Frege-Strawson theory” places presuppositions at the level of what Kaplan (1989) calls character. However, Frege’s notion of sense is closer to Kaplan’s notion of content, rather than to that of character. I consider the question whether the difference between the two approaches, the Fregean and the Strawsonian, has some bearing on the way in which presuppositions are represented in truth-conditional semantics. I look into the possibility of capturing this difference in the standard formal framework for truth-conditional semantics developed in von Fintel and Heim (2011) for intensional contexts. On my interpretation, a Fregean account of presuppositions treats the intension of an expression which carries a presupposition as a partial function. On a Strawsonian account, the character of an expression which carries a presupposition is a partial function from contexts to intensions. I compare the predictions of the two theories for the analysis of de dicto readings of definite descriptions embedded non-doxastic propositional attitudes ascriptions.
Andreea Popescu (Research Institute of the University of Bucharest): "Reference and Institutions"
This paper answers the following question: What is the nature of the reference of terms we use for institutions? Consider the following instances “The President of Romania might have been the head of the government if Romania were a presidential republic.” and “The President of Romania might have met the current President of the U.S.A., but he didn’t.” I argue that such terms behave both as definite descriptions and as proper names. In the first instance, “the President of Romania” behaves as a proper name, while in the second sentence, it behaves as a definite description. I explain this ambiguity and argue that it depends on certain linguistic frameworks. I argue that within the linguistic framework of the world of things, the terms behave as definite descriptions, and within the linguistic framework of the world of social things they behave as proper names.
Dan Zeman (Slovak Academy of Sciences): "New Applications of the Assessment-Sensitivity Framework"
The idea that various expressions in natural language are assessment-sensitive (that is, their denotation depends not only on the context of utterance, but also on the context of assessment) is not new. Authors such as MacFarlane (2003, 2005, 2009, 2014), Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson (2005), Lasersohn (2005, 2016), etc. have applied this idea to a large array of perspectival expressions such as predicates of taste, aesthetic adjectives, moral terms, epistemic modals, gradable adjectives, knowledge attributions, conditionals, future contingents, etc. In this presentation, I attempt to make a prima facie case that the framework can be applied to yet other natural language expressions, including some socially relevant ones. For example, the view is suitable both as a descriptive account of gender terms ("man", "woman", "non-binary") and for an ameliorative one; it seems to offer a simple treatment of dogwhistles ("inner city", "welfare"); and it can be applied to expressives ("jerk", "asshole") and perhaps slurs. To be sure, in order to apply to such expressions, various modifications of the core idea of the framework will have to introduced. But, although many details remain to be ironed out, I take the prospect of applying the assessment-sensitivity framework to the expressions listed to show both its fruitfulness and its capacity to illuminate important social phenomena.