This is a biweekly seminar organized by ALEF (Cluj-Napoca, Romania) - a research group focusing on logic, epistemology, and analytic philosophy (broadly conceived) in general - hosting talks both in English and Romanian. The seminar is organized by Adrian Briciu (West University of Timișoara), Adrian Ludușan (Babeș-Bolyai University), Mihai Rusu (Babeș-Bolyai University), Paula Tomi (University of Bucharest) and Dan Zeman (University of Warsaw). Check out this Facebook page for details.
(Note: this is not the official website of the group. To get there, click on "ALEF" above.)
For previous seminars organized by the group (in Romanian), click here. The group also has organized a couple of workshops, aimed at binging together Romanian researchers to make their work know to each other: First ALEF Workshop in Analytic Philosophy (Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, December 19-20, 2018) and Second ALEF Workshop in Analytic Philosophy (online, September 25-26, 2020). It also has a YouTube channel with talks from the seminar.
NEXT MEETING:
February 19, 18.00 (EET)
Bogdan Oprea, “On Representation: Kant, Davidson and Rorty”
Schedule
In the 2020-2021 academic year, the seminar takes place on every other FRIDAY, from 18.00 to 20.00 (Romania time). Click the "+" to see the abstracts. Posters by Iovan Drehe.
JUNE 18
Sonia Roca-Royes (University of Stirling), TBA
Sonia Roca-Royes (University of Stirling), TBA
MAY 21
Ciprian Bogdan (Babeș-Bolyai University), TBA
Ciprian Bogdan (Babeș-Bolyai University), TBA
APRIL 23
Claudiu Mesaroș (West University of Timișoara), “Genul protreptic și convertirea la filosofie”
Claudiu Mesaroș (West University of Timișoara), “Genul protreptic și convertirea la filosofie”
APRIL 9
Crăița Florescu (University of Iași), TBA
Crăița Florescu (University of Iași), TBA
MARCH 26
Andrei Achim (Technical University Cluj-Napoca/Northern University Baia Mare), TBA
Andrei Achim (Technical University Cluj-Napoca/Northern University Baia Mare), TBA
MARCH 19
José Ángel Gascón (UNED), “Argumentative Bullshit”
José Ángel Gascón (UNED), “Argumentative Bullshit”
MARCH 5
Andreea Popescu (University of Bucharest/SNSPA), TBA
Andreea Popescu (University of Bucharest/SNSPA), TBA
FEBRUARY 19
Bogdan Oprea, "On Representation: Kant, Davidson and Rorty
Bogdan Oprea, "On Representation: Kant, Davidson and Rorty
JANUARY 25
Mircea Dumitru (University of Bucharest), "Fictionalism and Free Logics”
Mircea Dumitru (University of Bucharest), "Fictionalism and Free Logics”
JANUARY 29
Răzvan Ioan (New Europe College), "Machiavelli's Epistemology: Anti-Platonism in The Prince"
Răzvan Ioan (New Europe College), "Machiavelli's Epistemology: Anti-Platonism in The Prince"
DECEMBER 4
Nicoletta Bartunek, "A Few Thoughts on Later Wittgenstein and Quasi-Realism"
Nicoletta Bartunek, "A Few Thoughts on Later Wittgenstein and Quasi-Realism"
Roughly, there are three main ideas underlying Blackburn’s quasi-realism: that moral statements do not represent facts or properties (1); that such statements "project our sentiments" onto actions - they are best seen as "attitudes" (2); finally, that moral statements can be said to be true or false, and they can be embedded in conditionals (and in the logical calculus in general) (3). Concerning Wittgenstein, he stresses (1) as soon as the Tractatus and there is no reason to think he changed his mind about it. Moreover, he later links the status of ethical terms to those of avowals and gestures of approval and disapproval – as the quasi-realist does at (2). Concerning (3), Wittgenstein prefers to avoid “truth” for non-descriptive statements, but he acknowledges that relying on it is not misguided.
This presentation will defend the proposed juxtaposition from the following two counter-arguments. Firstly, that Wittgenstein abandoned the topic of morals and ethics in his later philosophy, making (2) implausible. Secondly, against (3), that Blackburn advocates for a separate semantics for ethical and moral discourse, and this is thoroughly unwittgensteinan. My claim on the first account will be that Wittgenstein’s idea that "meaning is use" can very well cover the disputed topics. On the second, that Blackburn himself changed his mind about the workings of his project: the stated purpose now is to give a Wittgensteinian perspicuous representation of morals. And Wittgenstein’s views about truth not only confirm Blackburn’s (3) but can enrich it greatly.
This presentation will defend the proposed juxtaposition from the following two counter-arguments. Firstly, that Wittgenstein abandoned the topic of morals and ethics in his later philosophy, making (2) implausible. Secondly, against (3), that Blackburn advocates for a separate semantics for ethical and moral discourse, and this is thoroughly unwittgensteinan. My claim on the first account will be that Wittgenstein’s idea that "meaning is use" can very well cover the disputed topics. On the second, that Blackburn himself changed his mind about the workings of his project: the stated purpose now is to give a Wittgensteinian perspicuous representation of morals. And Wittgenstein’s views about truth not only confirm Blackburn’s (3) but can enrich it greatly.
NOVEMBER 20
Eduardo Pérez Navarro (University of Granada), "The Way Things Go: Moral Relativism and Suspension of Judgment"
Eduardo Pérez Navarro (University of Granada), "The Way Things Go: Moral Relativism and Suspension of Judgment"
A popular accusation against moral relativism is that it goes too far in its vindication of tolerance. The idea behind accusations like this can be summarized in the slogan, frequently attributed to relativism, that “anything goes”. The aim of this paper is to defend moral relativism from the accusation that it is an “anything goes” view; from the accusation that it forces us to suspend our judgment in cases in which we do not think we should even be allowed to. In the end, relativism is not an “anything goes” view because it is not a view about what goes, but about the way things go - about what goes on when we say that something is morally right or wrong. There is indeed a view, sometimes called “relativism”, that forces us to suspend our judgment about practices that do not allow for such comfort, but it is not so much moral relativism as moral contextualism. Apparently, though, the most salient alternative to “anything goes” views such as contextualism is not moral relativism. It is moral objectivism, according to which there is a fact of the matter about moral issues. However, I show that moral objectivism too ends up being an “anything goes” view unless the objectivist takes herself to be endowed with “God’s point of view”, something that I prove troublesome.
VALIE EXPORT counts as one of the most prominent contemporary Austrian artists, having begun her artistic career in the Viennese experimental context of the 1960s. Her works with cinema, starting in the late 60s under the banner of Expanded Cinema, leading up to performances in which the (female) body takes centre stage, video art and conceptual photography speak of a complex engagement with the present state of society from a critical point of view. In the following presentation, I would like to engage with her work, not simply via interpretation, but by attempting to emphasize her artistic methodology. It is in this sense, I believe, that the political dimension of her works can be fully brought to light. For this purpose, we can already point to two strategies – one which opts for the fragmentation of representation and another for literalization and the creation of word plays. I would like to interpret both of these strategies as an attempt to re-define and engage with a dominant regime of visibility which informs society’s representation of itself. In other words, by describing these strategies as feminist aesthetics, they are means to express and bring to light a subjectivity which cannot find its place in the usual modes of representation. Furthermore, by placing her methodology in relation to Jacques Rancière’s discussion of politics as disagreement, her artistic practice in the late 1960s and early 70s will be seen as a contestation of a certain partitioning of the visible, which determines who can be seen and how, and who is the subject that can speak.
* What a strange person. This part of the title is a reference to Was für eine seltsame Maschine (What a strange machine), a work from 2004, which is in itself a free interpretation of a sentence from Diderot, “What a strange machine is language.” (Johanna Schwanberg, “Against the Division between Language and Image. The Relationship between Title and Work in the Oeuvre of VALIE EXPORT”, in exhibition catalogue VALIE EXPORT. Time and Countertime, edited by A. Husslein-Arco, A. Nollert, S. Rollig, Walther König, Köln, p. 246).
* What a strange person. This part of the title is a reference to Was für eine seltsame Maschine (What a strange machine), a work from 2004, which is in itself a free interpretation of a sentence from Diderot, “What a strange machine is language.” (Johanna Schwanberg, “Against the Division between Language and Image. The Relationship between Title and Work in the Oeuvre of VALIE EXPORT”, in exhibition catalogue VALIE EXPORT. Time and Countertime, edited by A. Husslein-Arco, A. Nollert, S. Rollig, Walther König, Köln, p. 246).
OCTOBER 23
Bogdan Dumitrescu (University of Bucharest), "Freedom and Metaphysics of Time: The Open Future versus the A-theories of Time"
Bogdan Dumitrescu (University of Bucharest), "Freedom and Metaphysics of Time: The Open Future versus the A-theories of Time"
OCTOBER 16
Iovan Drehe (Technical University of Cluj-Napoca), "Despre consistența hegelianismului ca model de istoriografie filosofică"
Iovan Drehe (Technical University of Cluj-Napoca), "Despre consistența hegelianismului ca model de istoriografie filosofică"