FORMS OF CONTEXT-SENSITIVITY 2

April 14, 2026
University of Porto
Institute of Philosophy
Via Panorâmica s/n 4150-564 Porto
Sala de Reuniões 2


​DESCRIPTION

Many (if not most) expressions in natural languages are context-sensitive, at least in the sense that the same sentences comprising them, when uttered in different contexts, can intuitively have different truth values. There are many ways in which this phenomenon can come about. The meaning of many context-sensitive expressions depends on the context in which they are uttered. Thus, one of the most common forms of context-sensitivity is indexicality: the meaning of expressions such as "I", "here", "now" etc. depends on the speaker's situation. Other expressions are dependent on less objective contextual factors, such as the speakers' beliefs, intentions or preferences. Another source of this form of context-sensitivity comes from the presuppositions the relevant expressions trigger. Finally, many expressions are said to be polysemous, with the exact meaning of a word in certain context being determined by pragmatic mechanisms. But there are other ways in which the context-sensitivity mentioned can manifest. For example, it has been contended that the meaning of certain expressions  - and hence the truth value of the sentences in which they occur - depends on the content in which they are assessed.
In this second workshop (see here the first), we explore some of these forms of context-sensitivity, in relation to various natural language expressions. We address questions such as what is the difference between expressivsm and relativism, what are communicative intentions, whether normative considerations should play a role in semantic theorizing, what is the best account of dogwhitles, etc. - as well as various crucial details that arise in connection to these questions.


ORGANIZATION

The workshop is organized by Dan Zeman and Alba Moreno Zurita.


PROGRAM
13.50: Welcome
14.00-14.50: Eliot Michaelson & Henry Schiller (King's College London), "What are Communicative Intentions?"
15.00-15.50: Tamara Dobler (Free University of Amsterdam), "Which Game Are You Playing? Occasion-sensitivity and Gender Terms"
coffee break
16.10-17.00: Dan Zeman (University of Porto), "An Assessment-Sensitivity Account of Dogwhistles"
17.10-18.00: Eduardo Perez Navarro (University of Santiago de Compostela), "On the Relation between Relativism and Expressivism"


ABSTRACTS

Tamara Dobler (Free University of Amsterdam), "Which Game Are You Playing? Occasion-sensitivity and Gender Terms"
Contextualist theories of language hold that what is said - and thus the truth-conditions of an utterance - depend on contextual standards. This view fits well with familiar cases: whether "John is tall" is true may depend on whether we are discussing children or basketball players. However, when contextualism is applied to politically significant terms such as gender terms, it appears to generate troubling consequences. As Saul (2012) argues, contextualism predicts that different interpretations of terms like "woman" can be correct relative to different contexts. In a medical context a biological (trans-exclusionary) interpretation may determine what is said, whereas within a trans community a trans-inclusive interpretation may be operative. If contextual standards determine correct use, both uses appear equally legitimate—even though one may be morally problematic. This raises the question whether contextualism itself is morally problematic. Some philosophers argue that ethical considerations should be incorporated directly into the semantics of gender terms (Díaz-León 2016), while others caution against building morality into semantics (Laskowski 2020; Chen 2021). I defend the latter approach. Contextualism as a theory of meaning should resist moral encroachment. Ethical scrutiny should instead be directed at the projects or games that structure interpretation. Drawing on Travis’s notion of occasion-sensitivity (Travis 2006; 2008), I argue that contextual standards arise from the goals of the language games speakers are engaged in (Dobler 2019; 2022). If the goal of a game is discriminatory, the appropriate response is to refuse to play it; if the goal is legitimate but some linguistic “pieces” produce harmful effects, speakers may renegotiate the terms of the game - for instance by proposing less exclusionary terminology.

Eliot Michaelson & Henry Schiller (King's College London), "What are Communicative Intentions?"
What are communicative intentions? In one sense, the answer is simple: intentions to communicate. But this merely points to another difficult question: what is communication? And answers to that question typically rely on a particular understanding of communicative intentions in order to rule out the possibility of any old co-thinking which is caused by an utterance counting as communicative success. Here, we argue that it is possible to communicate without intending to communicate - and that this speaks against communicative intentions being reflexive. Instead, we put forward a view according to which communication depends on a particular kind of causal link between what the speaker has said and the resultant mental state of the listener. One good indication of this causal link being present is that, had the speaker's signal been slightly different, the listener's end state would likewise have been slightly different. Intentions to communicate, then, are intentions to bring about this kind of causal dependence.

Eduardo Perez Navarro (University of Santiago de Compostela), "On the Relation between Relativism and Expressivism"
The way they are sometimes characterized, relativism is the view that some sentences express propositions whose truth-value depends on a parameter determined by the context of assessment, while expressivism is the view that those sentences do not express propositions at all. In this talk I will argue that this characterization of expressivism is ambiguous in two related ways. First, it is not clear what kind of theory expressivism is according to it. Is it a theory about the meaning of certain sentences? Or is it a theory about their use? Second, the word “proposition” that figures in the characterization is itself ambiguous. I will argue that if we disambiguate our characterization of expressivism in a certain way the two theories are not incompatible. In fact, I will argue that, once we understand expressivism in that way, relativism follows from it.

Dan Zeman (University of Porto), "An Assessment-Sensitivity Account of Dogwhistles"
Dogwhistles are expressions by which a speaker communicates a “hidden meaning”, oftentimes with an ulterior motive. Although dogwhistles don’t form a specific linguistic class, what they have in common is that on top of being used with their conventional meaning, they are also used with a different, “codified” one to transmit problematic content (racist, sexist, homophobic, etc.). This allows speakers and hearers to plausibly deny that they entertain such content, making dogwhistles a very effective tool in political manipulation and propaganda. In this paper, I put forward a simple, hitherto undiscussed, account of dogwhistles. The core of proposal is to construe such expressions as assessment-sensitive (in the sense of MacFarlane 2014). I will show that what is known as “content relativism” – the view according to which the content of an utterance is determined in the context of assessment, is a suitable candidate for an adequate account of dogwhistles.